You can't conflate cognitive functions with locomotive functions. Computationally, locomotion is actually much harder than cognition. AI has made impressive advances in cognition, not in locomotion. There are not going to be any effective humanoid robots anytime soon.

Multicellular life only has effective locomotion due to 500+ million years of evolution driven by massive selection pressures (in contrast, cognitive functions had much weaker selective pressures).

As it turns out, advancements in technology have reached a point where offensive operations are no longer strongly favored in confrontations between two opposing armies with equal technological capabilities.

Its not about technology, though. It is very difficult for an attacking force to make any headway when the defending forces are numerically superior to them. You are supposed to outnumber the defender by a significant margin before you launch an attack; the old rule of thumb was to achieve a three to one ratio for a near guaranteed breakthrough. The Ukrainians have always outnumbered the Russians on the ground, especially in infantry. They have lots of foot soldiers to hold the entire frontline in strength, with enough in reserve to respond to any Russian attacks. Thats the main reason why the war has bogged down into a stalemate.

The other reason is that it takes a high degree of combat proficiency (leadership, training, initiative, etc) in order to successfully execute mobile warfare. The Russians have shown that while they are more competent than the Ukrainians, they are still not competent enough to prosecute deep offensive operations. They simply have no answer to the Ukrainian numerical superiority, other than to try to bleed them dry in attritional warfare (using their artillery superiority to inflict disproportionate casualtys). This approach shows not only a limited tactical repertoire, but an apalling disregard for human life

And aside from that, neither Russia nor Ukraine is at the cutting edge of technology in terms of their Army equipment. The most common MBT in use by both sides is theT-64 and T-72 tank, dating back from the 1960s and 1970s. Russias aerospace equipment is state of the art, though, as is its electronic warfare equipment.

Thanks to modern telecommunications technology, it is no longer possible to mobilize large amounts of men and materiel in secret and launch surprise blitzkrieg offensives.

But the Russians did exactly that at the start of the war. They covertly mobilised their Army and launched a surprise attack on the Ukraine, taking them off guard. Whether that surprise was achieved in spite of good intelligence is irrelevant; whatever intelligence the Ukrainians supposedly had did not motivate them to take any precautions. The Russians were able to make impressive advances in the first week of the war due to the element of surprise. But they failed to capture the capital of Kiev, or to deal a crippling blow to the Ukrainian Army. Because of that, the Russians committed a strategic blunder. They squandered their chance to end the war quickly and decisively. They were just a step short of achieving the kindof Blitzkrieg victorys that the Germans routinely pulled off during WW2.

Because this kind of war is best-suited for traditional, conservative societies with both large numbers of patriotic men as well as the sufficient industrial capacity to support large armies in the field.

This is the kind of war that could be fought by pre-1945 Germany, Imperial Japan, Russia, or even early 20th century France. But ZOG, and especially Weimerica, is totally unsuited for such a war.

This is 100% correct. In spite of the deficiencys of their military, Russian society has a cultural ethos that is capable of sustaining a large scale war on the ground. They are able to do this while using less state-coercion than the Ukrainians are using to sustain the war effort. This is perhaps their most impressive achievement. It is not at all clear that the United States (or any other Western state) would be capable of sustaining a large ground war.