Now your edgy low IQ take swoops in for an encore. Poland was no buffer for anyone because it was small in all relevant criteria (landmass as physical buffer, soldiers, good officers, equipment, economic output), chaotic and it was losing the fight against its own enemies within. The bitter truth was this: Poland was bound to be a victim in a conflict between giants. Under Pilsudski they might have co-aligned, sure and that was probably one of Hitler's great regrets.

Even if we pretend that Germany (along with the SU) would not have attacked it and the serious ethnic problems could have been deferred, Poland's chaotic nationalism somehow soothed and it's jewish problem (even though Poland enacted a bunch of literally anitsemitic laws it was all but done) magically disappeared. Stalin commanded a never before weaponised amount of resources and enjoyed vast influence in a Europe that was on the brink of boiling over. He certainly did not wish to waltz through Poland into Germany although his army was large enough that neither Poland nor Germany could have done anything against just that. Stalin would have started a diversion, an escalation, a crisis that might have forced Germany's hand just like it did in 39. In fact, the anti German national fervor probably WAS Stalin's or rather the jew led NKVD's evil work. But all major powers feared the newcomer and tried to reassure Poland they'd help in any conflict which the new political generation simply naively believed.

The nuclear bomb was the only magic device that accomplished what the toothless brits, who already checked out of world history never managed to do on the continent. You seriously overerestimate the US' capabilities, the Brits feebleness, the French disinterest in losing another generation while underestimating the Russian war machine. Until the actual deployment of Fat Man & Little Boy, world diplomacy was completely unaware of its capabilities. So that's not only not an argument, it's either deep ignorance or a talmudic angle from your side.

But then you admit that Stalin was preparing his move for 42, a conservative (if not kosher) estimate by analysts - could have been earlier. Stalin assumed quite logically that his best play was a massive attack from behind, while Germany was occupied in the west. Poland's quick loss in 39 was caused partly from the SU deception because its strategy assumed Stalin to be an ally. So the MO was already established. But even in the worst case he would have had no trouble at all creating an ethnic casus belli, then blitzing through Poland, Germany and France in a couple of weeks, because his numerical advantage was that vast.

Hitlers troops did, in fact, save Europe and remove the jewish influence from Poland (who would be pretty much on par with the Ukraine right now in terms of orderliness and jewish dominance) through their sacrifice.