What conclusions did the world draw?

The bombing of Yugoslavia was an important and, apparently, highly underestimated turning point in relations between Russia and the West. Both the Russian elite and society painfully reacted to the tragic events in Yugoslavia. This may sound strange, but Russia once harbored idealistic sentiments about the great Western democracies. When the Cold War ended, it seemed that the US and NATO were unfairly slandered by Soviet propaganda. Unfortunately, there was a lot of truth to the Soviet propaganda. For Russia, it was quite painful to realize that world politics still resembled an aquarium full of hungry sharks. Moreover, Russia traditionally had close and friendly relations with Serbia and the Serbian people. But now the Serbs were publicly attacked and humiliated.

How Russian troops confronted NATO forces in Yugoslavia, in a significant post-Soviet first

The elites had their own reasons for concern. The Kremlin regarded Russia-US and Russia-West relations in an idealistic way. But, in 1999, Moscow clearly saw that international law doesn’t provide any guarantees on the global arena. Yugoslavia was destroyed without any serious grounds, simply because Western politicians had decided so. The country lost part of its territory and the cut-off enclave was subjected to ethnic cleansing while the world turned a blind eye. And all this was done under the guise of a “rules-based international order.” Territorial integrity was considered one of the inviolable principles of international law but it, too, was trampled. Moreover, in the general context of the Balkan wars and conflicts, all the blame was put on Yugoslavia/Serbia, regardless of whether the Serbs were rebels who fought against the government or vice versa. None of this resembled justice or law. It became clear that neither agreements nor international law could protect any country, including Russia, from external military force, and that countries could only rely on the political situation and their own ability to cope with threats.

This realization was doubly important since Russia had a similar problem with Islamist insurgents in Chechnya. The Kremlin could not help but think that, if the West could use this pretext to attack Yugoslavia, it could use the same strategy against Russia. On the other hand, Moscow came to the reasonable conclusion that if an arbitrator twists the rules as he likes, he loses authority. The sarcastic expression “You don’t understand, this case is different” – which implies the hypocrisy of those who condemn others for certain actions while engaging in condemned behavior – remains popular on Russian internet to this day. For the Russian political elite, Kosovo became a classic example of a “different case.” Western journalists and politicians often emphasized that the situation in Kosovo was unique. However, the ill-fated region was obviously no different from dozens of other hotspots. Why was Kosovo a “special case”? Why weren’t Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Serbian Krajina, or Catalonia just as exceptional? What other situations will be considered “special,” and what other conflicts between authorities and separatists will be sufficient grounds for NATO to carry out bombings and allow ethnic cleansing?

The bombing of Belgrade destroyed the image of a new “rules-based international order.” Of course, it wasn’t the last time that the rule of law and the demands of justice were ignored by the great world powers after the collapse of the Soviet Union – in fact, the bloody Iraq war followed only four years later. However, the events in Yugoslavia had clearly demonstrated that a country that wants to protect its sovereignty from external threats can only rely on its own strength and on proven allies.