Hello, I was on vacation for the long weekend, but I didn't forget about you.

I am back and can only admit that my prediction was way out of whack - I predicted they'd abandon the land bridge by Friday, and it's now Tuesday, and victories are being measures on the level of klishiivka and pyatykhaty.

I was wrong and it's important for me to evaluate WHY.

I had some faulty assumptions. It's now my job to go back and see - what sources fed those assumptions? What other conclusions did the assumptions inspire?

Here's what I think.

Ruzzia's defense has been aligned with their doctrine, which was a surprise I think to a lot of people, given how their assaults were totally improvised. I have been surprised at ruzzia's deployment of rotor and fixed wings during Ukraine counterattacks, and I have also been surprised that their organisation and resupplies have, effectively held together even though there are local reports of thirst, cholera and malaria, himars and storm shadow nonsense.

My conclusion is that ruzzia's back-line organisation is far beyond what I expected. I will try to learn more about the topic of their back-line doctrines, because it was a major blind spot for me here.

I will revise my prediction.

I no longer think a week or two til Berdiansk.

But Zelensky promised beers on the beech this year, and so far reality cleaves to his word. It will be too cold in krym by October, so he has a few months yet.

I do not believe that my misunderstanding of ruzzia's high back-line organisation, overall impacts my predictions for the overall course of this war. I still think the land bridge will have to be evacuated, but we're looking at weeks instead of days.