The two main things worth referencing:

Regarding the Burkean social contract: most or possibly all of his writings on this topic are in Reflections on the Revolution in France. Burke basically criticizes this earlier, more liberal (and ironically, exclusive, and thus in a strange sense less liberal) Rousseauian social contract.

Because it seems impossible to move away from Social Contract Theory and back towards theories of Divine Right, I imagine that we are essentially stuck in this mode of thinking, and thus that the Burkean social contract is the closest thing we really have to ridding ourselves of existing social contracts. The Burkean version is obviously vastly superior for ethnonationalism, since 'the dead' practically entirely coincides with our race (i.e. our ancestors) and 'the unborn' largely coincides also with our race. Thus I think it is a satisfactory substitute.

Regarding the soul: Most or possibly all of the writings upon which I am grounding my reasoning are found in Descartes' excellent Meditations on First Philosophy. The conception of soul that Descartes outlines is also more similar to the kind of soul that people believe in today compared to whatever the Socratics believed, and thus more relevant to our times. However, I think it is also one that provides an obvious gateway to both egalitarianism and to trans-whatever.

Firstly, due to the scientific unverifiability of the soul's existence and its properties (which essentially holds true for any conception of the soul) which leads us to assume that they are essentially equal, because it is only through differing properties that we are able to differentiate between them and thus consider that some souls may be superior to others to begin with. In the absence of observable differing properties between two objects, we assume them to be the same (e.g. race denialism thrives on observable genetic differences being quite small); ergo, egalitarianism. However, the body's existence (which is all there is in physicalism) is obviously verifiable and thus does not have this problem.

Secondly, due to the possibility that the 'true' self (soul) in some way may have properties incongruent with the 'false' self (body) into which it has been ensouled. If one has a 'true' self and a 'false' self, it leaves open the possibility perhaps the species, race, sex, etc. of one differ from the other. I believe it is Keith Woods who mentioned at some point that trans-anything relies on this type of metaphysical dualism, since trans-anything always relies on a certain type of reasoning: 'I appear to be this (human, male, White, etc.), but this is false, and I am "really" that!' (e.g. attack helicopter trapped inside a human body, female trapped inside a male body, black trapped inside a White body, etc.). I am thus not alone in having made this observation. However, monism (i.e. both idealism and physicalism, but not dualism) also prevents much of this because they do not bifurcate selves into two potentially incongruent entities to begin with.

Regarding metaphysical idealism: Berkeley refers to Bishop George Berkeley, who approached idealism from a Christian perspective. Kastrup refers to the contemporary philosopher of Brazilian extraction, Bernardo Kastrup, who approaches idealism from a scientistic perspective, and whose work has received some attention from Keith Woods.