Regarding your first paragraph: Just as America's classical liberals assumed that subsequent generations would destroy classical liberalism, it should be assumed by today's 'Dissident Right' that subsequent generations would destroy the ethnostate. Anything short of assuming the worst case scenario is simply to repeat the Founders' mistakes: ones which would have easily been rectified by ensuring that the Constitution was far more concrete than the vague seven articles than they gave; for example, by ensuring that the established Republic was explicitly racial rather than making the few vague statements that they made about 'free White men', which were in hindsight obviously grossly insufficient.

We have few historical examples of where an ideational state has been founded—and indeed the ethnostate shall in part be ideational: it cannot be just White, but also ideologically White-positive—and we should be heeding their mistakes rather than ignoring them out of the foolish view that people will know better in the ethnostate. They won't. They will quickly become comfortable and they will squander it. To say anything else is to learn nothing from America.

And indeed America rapidly moved away from the Founders' ideal. The Founders largely opposed political parties, and yet parties became rapidly entrenched not long after, especially after the 1830s. Washington himself claimed that it was impossible to govern without God and the Bible, and yet America has thrown all of that out long ago. America's attempts at 'innovation', its continued (albeit much weakened) belief in a guaranteed, unilinear 'progress', etc. are part and parcel with its decline.

In short, I think you have taken a good stab at summarizing some part of my views on this matter, and I simply disagree upon the value-judgement that you have applied to them. It is correct to have 'zero faith', to have layer upon layer of safeguards of all kinds applied such that not a single fundamental core idea, policy, value and all else that is of immense importance is alterable. To say anything otherwise strikes me as:

1) Refusing to learn lessons from history, particularly from the American experiment;

2) Compromising with liberalism too deeply, particularly by placing a 'faith' that I consider completely unwarranted in human nature.

I particularly disagree with that last sentence of yours, for if (and in the hypothetical ethnostate, this will happen at some point) that future generations will after a time no longer wish to affirm White-positivity and any other core, non-negotiable value in order to pursue the path of liberalization all over again, then it is clearly my view that a totalitarianism unlike anything that Man has ever witnessed must be applied to them, lest they again pursue those paths that we are following, ones that they must under absolutely no circumstance whatsoever also follow.

Regarding this essentially metaphysical question to which your second paragraph is devoted: modern egalitarianism has clearly benefited from the kind of Cartesian view in which the soul, whose existence is unverifiable, is in fact the true self, and in which the body is akin merely to any other object in the physical world, albeit one to which our souls have a special relationship (e.g. introspective access). Because the properties of something whose existence is unverifiable are also unverifiable, Cartesianism perfectly augments egalitarianism. For without being able to verify these properties which would allow us to distinguish between souls, we are wont to assume that each soul is simply equal. If one cannot measure, for example, the 'goodness' or any other quality of a soul (and one cannot), the human mind will simply reason that each soul is equal in its goodness.

This is what I mean when I state that I am a physicalist-leaning dualist moving further towards the physicalist position most popular in the sciences. Physicalism is simply a much better stance for the justification of hierarchy, and for the abolishing of the ruinous ideal of equality, because the existence of bodies and their qualities is verifiable. That is what I mean when I write that a 'Master Race' is far more convincing than its analogue, 'God's Chosen'. Jews roleplay as a spiritual Master Race because few would ever believe them if they claimed to be a biological Master Race. Whites, however, do not need to roleplay as a spiritual Master Race, because they, unlike Jews, can convince themselves that they are indeed a biological Master Race, just as they had done in NatSoc Germany. And Whites, if challenged on their claim, can simply list their numerous biological advantages, whereas Jews can only state something along the lines of 'our souls are superior to yours', which is clearly an unverifiable claim and not a fit enough ideological safeguard for an ethnostate to justify why its people are both different and valuable enough not to be assimilated to extinction into the amorphous dull brown mass of 'humanity'.

I should add that, if it is not already clear, I was arguing against Cartesianism. I don't think that the Socratic conception is what people have in mind when they think about souls, therefore I consider the Socratics' views, and all views that differ from this predominant Cartesian view, irrelevant. Christians, for example, are always using this blank slate Cartesian soul as a justification for their racial egalitarianism, and I see physicalism as being the solution to that problem. This, I think, is what your last sentence there means: I am indeed dealing with the 'modern definition' precisely because that is the one which is here in the world today, and I am not dealing with this 'traditional concept' precisely because that one is not.

What you have done in your second paragraph is essentially to claim that I have set up a false dichotomy between the preferencing the metaphysical and preferencing the physical. And indeed I preference the latter. However, much of my post also claims that the metaphysical is useful insofar as it reinforces these arguments (e.g. ancestor worship reinforces ethnonationalism). But the metaphysical is only ever instrumentally useful. What I clearly oppose is the preferencing of the metaphysical over the physical, not the metaphysical per se. I am obviously opposed, for example, to the ethnostate being solely justified on religious or otherwise non-physicalist grounds. However, the non-physicalist entities of souls and so forth are not a threat unless they threaten to supplant race (the ethnostate would obviously be no more if a religious identity took precedence over a racial one, since a religious identity leaves open the possibility that racial outsiders can become part of the in-group via conquest, conversion, etc.). One historical lesson of European colonialism is that religious identities are ruinous for the race, because the Christianization of nonwhites made them a part of the in-group and thus helped facilitate contemporary multiculturalism by reducing the distance between us and them.

Regarding Socrates, I believe this to be an argument against Nietzsche rather than myself. I do not proclaim to be an expert either on Nietzsche or the Socratics, so I will leave that one to those who better know of Nietzsche's claim that Socrates was a kind of 'father' of slave morality who simply ruined the more ascriptivist, physicalist worldview of his time, in which people were judged by verifiable physical qualities rather than unverifiable spiritual ones. I believe that Nietzsche made a similar claim about the Jews.

Regarding the change in character, I think it is very much reconcilable with a physicalist worldview. What you may ascribe to the changes in the soul, I may simply ascribe to changes in the brain and to changes in the sociological 'collective consciousness'. I simply take what was once explained by philosophy and prefer to explain it by psychology, sociology, and not necessarily by biology. Obviously, if you are positing a dichotomy in which what cannot be explained by philosophy must be explained by raw biology, which is how I am reading it, then I would declare that false. The social in particular cannot be reduced entirely to the biological or individual-psychological despite Weberianism and 'methodological individualism' suggesting that it can, an observation to which sociologists owe Durkheim. I am definitely not as scientistic as Dutton, who clearly reduces everything to biology, a worldview which both suggests and reinforces an extreme physicalism very well. However, such a view is one I find much more believable (as well as vastly more useful) than its effective antithesis in extreme idealism, if forced into a dichotomous choice between the two. I should also add that dualist stances are very useful for enabling transsexualism, transspeciesism and transracialism, since the idea that 'true' self is in fact not simply the body leaves open the possibility that the 'true' self is in some way at odds with the body: the soul is 'trapped' in a body of the wrong species, race or sex. Physicalism makes ascriptivist, essentialist views of humans easier: if there is no 'true' self other than the body, it is much more difficult to justify those ideas.

I should add that I appreciate your response, which has very much served to exercise my mind on these questions.