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[–]beermeem 3 insightful - 2 fun3 insightful - 1 fun4 insightful - 2 fun -  (6 children)

Matter itself is not “conscious.” When arrange in various ways, matter is able to receive consciousness.

Nikola Tesla already answered this question, essentially. He theorized that the “brain” is not the generator of thought but functions like a radio receiver of thoughts, memories, ideas (i.e. consciousness) beamed to it by “higher”/universal consciousness — or as some have called it, the “Akashic” Records.

This is basic Judaic Kabbalism. So “scientific” questions such as this one are intended to be distractions for the “minds” of gentiles. Vajrayana Buddhism also covers all of this but on a much deeper level.

[–]magnora7[S] 4 insightful - 1 fun4 insightful - 0 fun5 insightful - 1 fun -  (5 children)

Interesting, but different ways of saying the same thing imo. Whether consciousness is inherent in all matter, or whether that is "beamed in" to a "receiver", the resulting expression in physical reality is the same result.

[–]beermeem 3 insightful - 2 fun3 insightful - 1 fun4 insightful - 2 fun -  (4 children)

Very fair. I suppose the more pointed question scientists could be asking, then, is: why do different types of matter exhibit different types of consciousness? i.e. what is it about the physical arrangement of the matter that causes the expression of consciousness?

[–]FormosaOolong 3 insightful - 2 fun3 insightful - 1 fun4 insightful - 2 fun -  (3 children)

What is it that makes the reflection of sunlight on the moon moonlight rather than sunlight?

[–]beermeem 1 insightful - 2 fun1 insightful - 1 fun2 insightful - 2 fun -  (1 child)

Semantics.

[–]FormosaOolong 1 insightful - 1 fun1 insightful - 0 fun2 insightful - 1 fun -  (0 children)

And isn't it interesting the way that semantics interfere with direct perception of reality?

[–]beermeem 1 insightful - 2 fun1 insightful - 1 fun2 insightful - 2 fun -  (0 children)

Wittgenstein addresses this question specifically. In Paragraph 95 of one of his final works, “On Certainty,” he writes:

The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.