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[–]Zapped 2 insightful - 1 fun2 insightful - 0 fun3 insightful - 1 fun -  (1 child)

You're going to have to point out the specific lines for me.

[–]SoCo[S] 2 insightful - 1 fun2 insightful - 0 fun3 insightful - 1 fun -  (0 children)

Biden formed an executive order which legalized government use of spyware, by establishing it illegal to buy spyware from companies that aid our enemies and sell it to people who use it against us or our allies. To ensure these government agencies aren't buying spyware from the baddies, he codifies a process for a government agency to declare its intent to by spyware from a vendor, so that they can get an Department of Intelligence assessment of the spyware and its vendor for approval. It makes clear that this is for the purpose of preventing the funding of computer weapons that undermine our country's security.

Sec. 2. Prohibition on Operational Use. (a) Executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall not make operational use of commercial spyware where they determine, based on credible information, that such use poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or that the commercial spyware poses significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person. [...]

Sec. 3. Application to Procurement. An agency seeking to procure commercial spyware for any purpose other than for a criminal investigation arising out of the criminal sale or use of the spyware shall, prior to making such procurement and consistent with its existing statutory and regulatory authorities:

Sec. 4. Reporting Requirements. (a) The head of each agency that has procured commercial spyware, upon completing the review described in section 2(h) of this order, shall submit to the APNSA a report describing the review’s findings.

Note: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA)


The targeted restrictions:

      (i)    Commercial spyware may pose counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government when:

           (A)  a foreign government or foreign person has used or acquired the commercial spyware to gain or attempt to gain access to United States Government computers or the computers of United States Government personnel without authorization from the United States Government; or

           (B)  the commercial spyware was or is furnished by an entity that:

                (1)  maintains, transfers, or uses data obtained from the commercial spyware without authorization from the licensed end-user or the United States Government;

                (2)  has disclosed or intends to disclose non-public United States Government information or non-public information about the activities of the United States Government without authorization from the United States Government; or

                (3)  is under the direct or effective control of a foreign government or foreign person engaged in intelligence activities, including surveillance or espionage, directed against the United States.

      (ii)   Commercial spyware may pose risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person when:

           (A)  the commercial spyware, or other commercial spyware furnished by the same vendor, has been used by a foreign government or foreign person for any of the following purposes:

                (1)  to collect information on activists, academics, journalists, dissidents, political figures, or members of non-governmental organizations or marginalized communities in order to intimidate such persons; curb dissent or political opposition; otherwise limit freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, or association; or enable other forms of human rights abuses or suppression of civil liberties; or

                (2)  to monitor a United States person, without such person’s consent, in order to facilitate the tracking or targeting of the person without proper legal authorization, safeguards, and oversight; or

           (B)  the commercial spyware was furnished by an entity that provides commercial spyware to governments for which there are credible reports in the annual country reports on human rights practices of the Department of State that they engage in systematic acts of political repression, including arbitrary arrest or detention, torture, extrajudicial or politically motivated killing, or other gross violations of human rights, consistent with any findings by the Department of State pursuant to section 5502 of the NDAA FY 2022 or other similar finding