Ranked-Choice Won't Fix Our Electoral System – Amelia May Johnson

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[–]Alan_Crowe 2 insightful - 1 fun2 insightful - 0 fun3 insightful - 1 fun -  (3 children)

The analysis in the article assumes that the same old parties run as usual

Let’s say there are four candidates: a Republican, a Democrat, a Libertarian, and a Green. In the first round, they get 30%, 29%, 20%, and 21% respectively. That looks great on paper, but none of them got a majority, so the Libertarian is eliminated.

The advantage that I see in Ranked-Choice is that it the current duopoly under FPTP is enforced by an actual mechanism and the Ranked-Choice breaks the enforcement mechanism.

Suppose that the BigParty and the LargeParty both agree on X. What are voters who want Y to do? They could form the SmallParty, which stands for Y not X and various other policies. Under FPTP, there is a mechanism enforcing party discipline. No BigParty voter is willing to switch to SmallParty over Y because that splits the BigParty vote and lets LargeParty win. Similarly No LargeParty voter is willing to switch to SmallParty over Y because that splits the LargeParty vote and lets BigParty win.

Ranked-Choice breaks that enforcement mechanism. Maverick BigParty voters can vote 1.SmallParty 2.BigParty 3.LargeParty. Meanwhile, iconoclast LargeParty voters can vote 1.SmallParty 2.LargeParty 3.BigParty. If the mavericks and the iconoclasts are a small part of the electorate, not much changes. The SmallParty still comes last, and drops out. Then their votes get swapped to the voters' second choices and the election proceeds as before. Same old same old. But notice: no-one got "punished" for voting third party.

Things have actually changed. Popular support of Y becomes visible. The SmallParty isn't immediately discouraged and can keep running. It can benefit from a loose coalition of BigParty voters who want Y and LargeParty voters who want Y. In later elections it might bring in enough votes to knock one of the mainstream parties into third place. Or a mainstream party might try to avoid that by switching from X to Y. The system is forced to listen to voters a little more.

[–][deleted] 1 insightful - 1 fun1 insightful - 0 fun2 insightful - 1 fun -  (2 children)

The analysis in the article assumes that the same old parties run as usual

That was just for simplicity; I don't even like any of those four.

Ranked-Choice breaks the enforcement mechanism.

So does literally any other electoral method. FPTP is the worst you can get while still calling it democratic.

Suppose that the BigParty and the LargeParty both agree on X. What are voters who want Y to do? They could form the SmallParty, which stands for Y not X and various other policies.

I'm curious, so I'll do a little simulation about this scenario. Let's say the BP has 49%, the LP has 51%, and about one-third of both parties support Y.

In FPTP: BP gets 48%, LP gets 50%, and SP gets 2%, since voters are scared of splitting the vote.

In RCV: BP gets 33%, LP gets 34%, and SP gets 33% in the first-round. BP and SP have the same percent, but let's say BP has less than 0.5% more votes, so SP is eliminated and their votes given back. LP would win the second round with 51% of the vote. If SP had a little more than BP: they'd win with 55% of the vote.

In approval voting: BP would get 49%, LP would get 51%, and SP would get 33%. LP would win.

For combined approval/favorability voting: let's assume one-furth of both parties really hate Y and only one-fourth of both major parties don't hate the other. BP would get 24%, LP would get 27% and SP would get 8%. LP would win once again.

RCV is the only one that really gave this party a chance — but only if BP voters chose them as a lesser evil against LP. Keep in mind: 66% of voters don't support Y and 25% of voters outright hate it; only one-third of the electorate would be happy if the SP's candidate one.

Now, if Y had majority support: all three alternative systems would likely produce an SP win.

[–]Alan_Crowe 2 insightful - 1 fun2 insightful - 0 fun3 insightful - 1 fun -  (1 child)

I agree that both RCV and Approval Voting solve the spoiler problem. Either would be an improvement over FPTP.

The UK had a referendum on voting reform. It offered the voters a two way choice: retain FPTP, change to RCV (in the UK it was called Alternative Vote. I think the issue is that semi-proportional elections, done with Ranked Choice in multi-member constituencies, is also popular in the UK. Consequently many people understand Ranked Choice voting as naming the complicated system that achieves a degree of proportionality with the voter ranking candidates).

In the UK referendum, many people refused to vote for Alternative-Vote/RCV because it wasn't their favourite. Then they ended up with FPTP, which they like even less. I, err, mumble mumble, cries in beer, diluting it down to 1% alcohol.

Due to that history, I'm very sensitive to the title "Ranked-Choice Won’t Fix Our Electoral System". Maybe RCV won't fix it, for an idealized notion of fix, but we should have voted for it anyway, to get an improvement over FPTP.

Thinking about Approval Voting versus RCV, I think that RCV is more likely to disrupt the party system. Imagine the Republicans are splitting into RINO and MAGA. Or maybe the Democrats are splitting into Bernie and Swamp. The abstract point about voting systems is best discussed with less emotionally charged party names. Consider BigParty versus LargeParty and the BigParty splits in BigOldParty and BigNewParty.

Under FPTP we might see a vote split 40% LargeParty 35% BigOldParty 25% BigNewParty. LargeParty wins! The splitists who broke away to found BigNewParty are punished by the system. That is how FPTP holds the two big parties together.

Under Approval Voting, all BigParty voters approve of both BigOldParty and BigNewParty, because they are afraid of the vote split. So the results are 40% LargeParty, 60% BigOldPary, 60% BigNewParty. Well, that solves the spoiler effect, but at a price. Voters are still having to vote tactically. And old time BigParty members who loyally vote for both factions may feel had. Whether the Old candidate gets in, or whether the New candidate gets in, is decided by some voters living dangerously and only approving one of the two Big party candidates. That is rather artificial.

Under RCV, voters can vote more straight forwardly. An old time BigParty member gets to chose whether to put the BigOldParty first, or whether to put the BigNewParty first. Counting the votes, we see the voters choosing between Old and New directly. I see that directness giving moral support to insurgents and encouraging them to start BigNewParty and disrupt the two party system.

[–][deleted] 1 insightful - 1 fun1 insightful - 0 fun2 insightful - 1 fun -  (0 children)

I agree that both RCV and Approval Voting solve the spoiler problem. Either would be an improvement over FPTP.

Yep. They tried to bring RCV to Arkansas in 2020, but the corrupt court struck down the ballot measure on a technicality. I was pretty disappointed when I found that out.

In the UK referendum, many people refused to vote for Alternative-Vote/RCV because it wasn't their favourite. Then they ended up with FPTP, which they like even less.

The sun really has set on the British Empire, cause they're pretty dull across the pond.

cries in beer, diluting it down to 1% alcohol.

That's 0.5% too much! Oh, sorry, this ain't s/prohibition.

Due to that history, I'm very sensitive to the title "Ranked-Choice Won’t Fix Our Electoral System". Maybe RCV won't fix it, for an idealized notion of fix, but we should have voted for it anyway, to get an improvement over FPTP.

Yeah, I explain that in the article, but I tend to be a bit over-dramatic when writing titles...

Under Approval Voting, all BigParty voters approve of both BigOldParty and BigNewParty

I don't think they'd all vote for the party they just broke up with.

So the results are 40% LargeParty, 60% BigOldPary, 60% BigNewParty. Well, that solves the spoiler effect, but at a price. Voters are still having to vote tactically.

Tactical voting is only when you don't vote for the candidate you like the most, which didn't happen here. Maybe some BNP voters voted for BOP out of fear, but most of them just liked both, since that was the party they used to be a part of.

I ain't sure what the "price" is, since the most popular faction still wins, but favorability voting (a modified form of approval voting) lets you vote for, vote against, or abstain; BNP voters will tend to abstain from voting for or against the BOP while mostly voting against the LP.

Under RCV, voters can vote more straight forwardly. An old time BigParty member gets to chose whether to put the BigOldParty first, or whether to put the BigNewParty first.

Okay, so let's see.

Under FPTP we might see a vote split 40% LargeParty 35% BigOldParty 25% BigNewParty.

Let's use these numbers for the RCV simulation. The BNP performed the worst, so they get eliminated and all their votes go to the BOP, which wins with 60% of the vote.

In RCV, the BNP didn't have a chance and was just immediately eliminated, while in approval voting: they tied with the BOP and had a very good chance of winning, with the outcome being decided by less than a percent. I see that as a good thing for third parties.