Indeed, it would help if the author could admit what he leaves out of his published work, both here and in his 2018 book. In the book, he addresses the Mossad problem in only one statement, almost like a footnote:

Certainly Anthony Cordesman’s disclosure of the existence of the Israeli army’s operational ‘Field of Thorns’ plan – dating back to 1996 – also points to the existence of a well-thought out plan in the event of a Palestinian uprising, which in retrospect appears to have been largely followed through on (see Cordesman, 2000; Elam, 2000). Israeli journalist Akiva Eldar brings evidence that substantiates the suspicion that Israeli Defense Force commanders ‘stoked the fires of the Intifada and carried out something of a military coup’ (Eldar, 2005). Basing his claims on the evidence of Raviv Druker and Ofer Shelah’s book Boomerang, Eldar relates that ‘high-ranking intelligence officers marketed the “no partner” myth to serve the interests of Barak and Sharon, despite there being no support for this in the assessments of Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet or the Mossad’ (see ibid; Druker and Shelah, 2005). Eldar elaborates that:

"a long series of Israeli acts of sabotage on cease-fire initiatives that ended in terror attacks, alongside a long series of foul-ups in the construction of the separation fence, the delay of which continues to exact a human cost. [Druker and Shaleh] accuse ministers Shimon Peres and Ben-Eliezer of criminal negligence by lending a hand to the deterioration in the situation in the territories, and by standing idly by while Sharon, Mofaz, Ya’alon and Dichter undermined every chance for an easing in the hostilities." (Eldar 2005)

p. 184

Netanyahu's mid-late '90s role in all of this is skipped over in the book, as is the well-known Mossad influence on US intelligence agencies leading up to 9/11 and the response to it.