Hey guys, haven't posted in a while. I've been really busy off late and without stable internet.

Here are some stats of equipment losses and their implications.

https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html

The Ukrainians make incredibly outlandish claims about Russian losses that are impossible to believe. However, this guy Oryx seems to have a good catalog of Russian equipment losses in Ukraine. This guy is very anti-Russian but does a decent job in cataloging equipment losses for Russia.

It's easier to do so for Russia because the Ukrainians are running a publicity war and post vids of every single Russian loss on the internet. Some of these losses have also been found to be false as they're Ukrainian vehicles with Z painted on them. However, Oryx no doubt has missed some Russian losses here and there as well, so I think it balances out and we have a decent overview of equipment losses.

Russian losses:

Tanks- 192(65 destroyed). The bulk seems to be Soviet-era tanks. Not one T-90M lost. I think this can be attributed to its small numbers and perhaps its active protection system.

AFVs- 113. The overwhelming majority seem to be obsolete MT-LBs from the 60s.

IFVs- 166. Disproportionate losses of Airborne corps BMDs. Their light armor didn't do them much favor.

APCs- 63. Mostly Soviet-era BTRs.

Towed artillery- 26. The Russians use very little towed artillery. Probably mostly used by the rear-echelon national guard and other Donbas militia units.

SPGs- 28. Surprisingly low number as the Russians are an artillery army first and foremost and SPGs form the backbone of the artillery.

MLRS- 19. Again, very low numbers considering how heavily the Russians use it. I guess the Bayraktar drones weren't that useful and American supplied artillery radars didn't make much of a difference.

SAM systems- 29. Low number considering that the Russians are very anal on organic SAMs for their brigades. Not as many were destroyed as well. A lot of the equipment was abandoned due to a lack of fuel stemming from the rapid advance in the early days.

Fixed-wing aircraft- 12 of which one crashed and another was destroyed on the ground by a Tochka-U missile. Not as bad considering that Ukraine started the war with over 300 SAM systems and receive AWACS and ELINT data from US and NATO aircraft nearby.

The numbers could've been lower had it not been for some questionable tactics. The Su-34s were lost solely because they were sent on low-flying missions to drop unguided bombs. The logic seems to be that a lot of Ukrainian SAMs were still active and thus they could not fly high and use guided bombs.

In that case, Russian strike groups should've been escorted by Su-24E ELINT aircraft, Su-24F jammers, and Su-24s armed with anti-radiation missiles. This war reveals deficits in Russian airforce training which has seen a bit of neglect in favor of the army and the submarine force. The VKS doesn't come off as very well trained for complex air missions involving many types of aircraft.

Even then, the Su-34s flying low should've attacked from a distance with ait-to-surface missiles rather than going close with dumb bombs.

Helicopters- 13. Astonishingly low considering how heavily the Russian army used them. Russian rotary aviation has been the star of the show so far. They inflicted the most damage on Ukrainian ground units. At Hostomel alone, a force of 200 attack helicopters shattered an entire brigade of Ukrainian troops attacking just 200 Russian paratroopers.

The very low number is even more impressive when you consider that 3 of these were unarmed Mi-8s and Ukraine has been stuffed up to the eyeballs with stingers and other MANPADS.

Trucks, cars, and Jeeps- 337. Much lower than you'd expect in such a large operation. Again, even most of these would've been avoided if not for bad tactics in the first days. Convoys protected by helicopter escorts would've halved the truck losses.

Ukrainian loses:

We can't rely on Oryx for Ukrainian losses because the Ukrainians don't post pics of their losses. The Russians themselves have kept tight opsec and don't reveal much of their kills. Most of the Ukrainian ruined footage comes from Donbas militias under looser rules.

The Russian MoD so far has proven pretty honest in their statements about Ukrainian losses and the war in general. They would have a much better estimate of Ukrainian equipment losses after all. Though they might actually understate it as they fired a lot of cruise missiles on Ukrainian storage and repair shops and can't get exact confirmation.

Here are the Russian MOD numbers for Ukraine.

https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/76304/

Ukrainian losses:

Tanks, IFVs, and APCs: 1007

Towed artillery- 374

MLRS- 109

SAMS- 144

Radars- 88

Aircraft- 98

UAVs- 110

"Special military equipment" - 793. I guess this is an umbrella term under which artillery radars, engineering vehicles, de-mining vehicles, and communication vehicles fall.

These numbers seem realistic as the Ukrainian army has been overrun from a quarter of the nation's territory and doesn't seem to be capable of launching any counteroffensives anymore. The Russians have had huge air superiority from the start and helicopters have exacted devastating tolls.

Losses as a percentage of overall forces:

Tanks: Russia has around 2850 tanks in active service and out of this they've lost 192. Meaning they've lost 6.7% of tanks. However, they've deployed a total of 1400 tanks to the operation, so that means of deployed tanks, they've lost 13.7% of vehicles.

This number is actually pretty good. In 1967, Israel won a stunning victory over the Arabs in the six-day war. They lost 400 out of 800 deployed tanks. A 50% loss rate. The Israelis also lost huge numbers of tanks in 1973 as well, so much so that the US had to give them a huge resupply to keep them in the fight.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War

For APCs, IFVs, and AFVs: 342 Russian losses out of a total stockpile of 11,200 active vehicles. This amounts to a paltry 3% of active Russian vehicles of this category. I don't know the numbers for deployed vehicles for this operation but at most the losses would be 5%.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Russian_Ground_Forces

Ukraine has around some 1600 tanks and somewhere around 3000 APCs, IFVs, and AFVs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Ukrainian_Ground_Forces#Artillery

Thus, Ukraine has lost about 1007/4600 =22% of its entire armored force.

For artillery:

Russian artillery losses are paltry compared to its stocks. Only about 73 artillery systems lost out of a stock of 3700+ active artillery pieces. Perhaps around 2% loss.

For Ukraine, 493 artillery pieces out of a stock of some 2500 pieces. It represents a near 20% loss rate. Note: Ukrainian artillery is mostly vintage Soviet towed pieces and is only capable of stationary defense for forces hunkered down in cities.

For Aircraft:

The Ukrainians don't seem to have an airforce anymore. There's no footage of any strikes or combat patrols. They no doubt have some aircraft but they're most likely grounded due to lack of usable airfields and jet fuel. The Russians had 64 km long convoy outside kiev for days and the Ukrainian air force was unable to touch it.

It's very difficult to destroy an airforce to the last plane. Many Iraqi fighters survived both Iraq wars.

Russian air losses are superficial. 12 out of more than 500 simply deployed for this campaign. About 2% or so.

Ukraine still does have a significant number of SAM systems though and this will no doubt impede the VKS from carrying out strikes to their full potential.

Drone losses:

Ukraine seems to have run out of TB-2 Bayraktar drones...even after Turkey refilled them twice. The Turkish drones have had very minor success in Ukraine with only 5-6 successful attacks on Russian convoys. The Ukrainians most likely have no more drones left and have resorted to using very old Soviet Tu-142 drones.

Turkey can't resupply them anymore as the Russians have destroyed drones way faster than Turkey can produce them.

Russian drone losses have been light due to them avoiding the use of drones in earlier days. Now the usage of drones has increased and is mainly used for artillery spotting.

Personnel losses:

This is the tricky part. Russians claim to have killed 14,000 Ukrainian troops. I doubt Ru MOD has this down properly. However, even if we assume 10,000 Ukrainian KIA and twice as many wounded, it amounts to some 30,000 KIA and WIA.

Russian losses are harder to estimate but the CIA has it around 2000-4000 dead. The Russian losses are probably about 6000-12,000 KIA and WIA. My own guess would be closer to 6000 as Putin has not called on any reserves and has even refused Russian volunteers. Manpower shortage doesn't seem to be a thing for them.

Ammunition and fuel.

A major part that is often missed in such calculations is ammunition. Ukraine might have a shit ton of artillery but it's useless without ammo. Same for tanks. Ukraine was suffering from an acute ammo shortage before the war due to 8 years of war and low production rates.

After 16 days of artillery fire, they've lost a lot of ammo. Plus the Russians have launching heavy precision strikes on their ammo stores for the last 10 days. It's the best way to avoid casualties while weakening an enemy army.

https://twitter.com/nukesn_missiles/status/1502545962153267203

https://twitter.com/RWApodcast/status/1502572539469565952

Ukrainian forces seem to be increasingly falling silent, particularly the mass of their army in the Donbas.

The situation is even worse for fuel as fuel dumps have been hit throughout the country and without fuel, they'll be forced to abandon most of their vehicles.

The rapid Russian advance has also led to the loss of a lot of their fuel and ammo stocks.

The Ukrainian army as a whole is being starved of fuel and ammo. They can have as much vintage soviet gear as they like but it's useless without fuel or ammunition. The situation is much worse in the Donbas. With the capture of Izyum, only one major highway going through kramatorsk connects the Donbas group to the Ukrainian heartland, and no doubt it's under constant interdiction.

The scenario is quite reminiscent of the German army in France 1944. They lost thousands of tanks and guns not because allied artillery or bombers destroyed them, but simply because they ran out of fuel and ammo due to constant interdiction by P-51s and P-47s.

Assessment of forces:

It's clear that the Ukrainian army is reaching a breaking point. Their conventional forces are close to being spent. Increasingly, they'll be reliant on lightly armed militias with ATGMs and MANPADS holed up in cities, holding their populations as human shields.

Russian losses are superficial in terms of military capability though they do deal a prestige blow.

The Russian army seems to have awoken from its earlier stupor and become more serious. Russian black sea fleet assets have provided invaluable support in the form of Kalibr missile strikes.

The Russian air force is performing better now though its ability to carry out complex operations with large groups of aircraft leaves a lot to be desired. According to US estimates, they've only carried out 200 sorties per day, meaning only 3000 sorties in 15 days. It is possible that the Russians have intentionally held back their airpower because Ukrainian air defense still survives and out of a desire to limit casualties.

Russian helicopter aviation has been the standout star of the show.

Criticisms of Russian high command:

The Russian offensive could've been handled much better had it not been for some unworkable assumptions on the part of high command. It's not possible to really win a war without hurting anyone.

In the initial strikes, the Russians refrained from destroying Ukrainian aircraft on the ground, their barracks, or assassinating the Ukrainian general staff or government. They wished to spare the Ukrainian army in hopes that they'd surrender or run away. It did not materialize.

The army officers were not even told of the impending invasion and only learned when the war started, hence poor preparations and morale.

The focus of the Russian strategy from the get go has been southern Ukraine and the Donbas, that's where the decisive action was planned. The offensive towards Kiev drew in Ukrainian forces and left South Ukraine defenseless, allowing Russians there to easily overrun Kherson.

The forces deployed towards Kiev are Russia's second-tier units from the eastern military districts. They lost the most equipment, the Soviet vintage. The offensive was launched in a really bad time, in mud season. This prevented cross-country mobility and allowed Ukrainians to launch many ambushes on Russian convoys.

Supply lines were often unguarded and this led to fuel shortages and ambushes of convoys. They advanced over 400 km from the Russian border to Kiev via the area of Chernigov but left key cities of Sumy, Chernigov, and Nizhny untaken. They're now being slowly besieged. The Russian refusal to assault cities and cause civilian deaths has cost them dearly in the form of unguarded and vulnerable supply lines.

However, some improvements have been made and Russian convoys are now being guarded by helicopter escorts and fighter sweeps beforehand. For these reasons, Russian advances around Kiev have been lethargic, though I suspect it's also deliberate in the sense that it draws Ukrainian reinforcements away from other sectors.

The main problem for Rus MoD is that it devoted too few troops. Only around 210,000 troops(175,000 Russia, 35,000 LNDR) to advance across a 3000 kilometer frontline. Russian advances in the South were the best because initially, they were able to concentrate the most forces there, now it's diluted over a long frontline and momentum has stalled.

The Russian MoD really needs to mobilize another 100,000 troops. Even shitty troops with towed artillery and rifles will do, they can relieve the top tier units of siege and patrol duties and allow them to focus on breaking through the Ukrainian lines.

Russian missile stocks:

An interesting question is how many missiles Russia has left after generously using them for 15 days. The US estimated that Russia had used 760 long-range missiles.

The most common missile in the Russian arsenal is the Kalibr, launched from naval vessels.

I read somewhere that the initial rate of production for the missile was 170/year but in the 3 years up to the invasion it was doubled to 350/year.

3*350 = 1050 missiles.

Assuming that the Russians have been producing missiles for at least 6 more years before that, then 6*170 = 1020 missiles.

I'll assume that the production before that was spent on drills, training and Syria. Kalibr has been around since the 90s after all.

So, a total of 2070 Kalibrs in the Russian stock at the start of the war.

Iskander-M is easier to calculate. The Russians have 160 launch complexes, each with 4 missiles at its disposal. 160*4 = 640. Assuming they have one reload for each, that amounts ot 1280 missiles. If you assue two reloads, then 1920 missiles.

The Russians also have the Kh-59 Kazoo missile. An air launched 250-km range missile. It dates from the soviet era and the Russians no doubt have a lot of them. All three of their major strike platforms (Su-34, Su-24 and Su-30SM) can use it. All three aircraft together number nearly 600.

Let's assume they have enough missiles for every aircraft to make at least one sortie(two Kh-59s). That means 600*2 = 1200 missiles.

Then the Russians have the Kh-55 and Kh-101. The latter is a stealth missile and very high end. The Kh-55 itself is much older but it has an insanely long range. These are strategic weapons and are probably in short supply. Though, the Kh-55 has been spotted in use in Ukraine.

Perhaps, the Russians have some 300-400 of these variants?

So, for a lower order estimate, we have 2070 + 1280 + 1200 + 300 = 4850 missiles.

For a higher order estimate, we have 2070 + 1980 + 2400 + 400 = 7350 missiles.

The higher-order estimate looks a bit too high imo but it's not impossible. Iran is estimated to have 3000+ cruise and ballistic missiles in its inventory. So it should not be impossible for Russia with its great Soviet inheritance to have 7000+.

In any case, the Russians have used a significant stock of their long-range missiles and I expect their use to die down in the coming days as the remnants of Ukrainian air defenses are wiped out. Then, the VKS will likely fly in force.

Implications for modern warfare:

The greatest implications for modern war is that fancy terms like 4th gen warfare and gray zone warfare have been proven to be a bunch of rubbish. The fundamentals of large-scale war have not changed much since WW2.

The war has demonstrated the acute need for mass and numbers in order to hold rear areas and man long front lines. The belief that you don't need hundreds of thousands of troops and high-tech micro armies are enough have been proven to be BS.

200,000 Russian and LNDR forces are struggling to man a 3000 km front line. However, imagine if the war was with Poland. The Polish-Belarussian border is only 418 km long and the Poles only have 62,000 men in their army.

They'd simply have to conduct retreat after retreat to avoid being flanked by Russian forces.

I suspect there will be a revival of large conscription-based armies in several European countries after this war.

Another implication is that tanks are quite vulnerable to ATGMs. Russian ERA doesn't seem to have helped much against the Javelin. Active protection systems appear to be more effective in defending tanks.

My guess is that in the future, tank design will increasingly veer away from mobility and towards protection. Artillery is also a far greater threat to tanks than ever before. Future tanks will look more like the heavily armored M1A Abrams than the lighter and faster T-72 variants. Tank on tank kills have been very rare and most have fallen to ATGMs, artillery, or air attack.

Tanks will increasingly regress back to their role as fire support for infantry.

Attack drones with Biplane flight patterns like Bayraktar are no match for an army with capable air defense. If attack drones have a future, they will be as high flying autonomous drones like S-70 or the US reaper.